Russia’s Strategic Retreat in Georgia’s Neighborhood

Russia has traditionally sought to preserve and expand its influence over neighboring countries, often at the expense of their security and strategic interests. In recent years, however, Moscow has faced serious challenges and setbacks in the South Caucasus, particularly in Armenia and Azerbaijan. A similar trend can be seen in Russia’s relations with Türkiye. As Ankara’s political, economic, and military ambitions grow, Moscow’s sphere of influence in the region continues to shrink.

Armenia and Russia

On June 7, 2026, Armenia held historic parliamentary elections that attracted the attention of regional and global actors.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party won the elections with 49.75% of the vote and secured 64 seats. Therefore, the outcome confirmed that the Armenian government would unquestionably continue its policy of closer relations with the West and regional normalization. It is important to realize that, through its pro-Western foreign policy, Armenia is not simply choosing an ally but trying to survive among four major geopolitical actors: Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran.

Despite its vitally important electoral victory, Pashinyan’s government still faces several major challenges. It must manage the domestic political crisis, reduce Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia, and implement the peace agreement with Azerbaijan which requires additional constitutional changes. However, the governing party failed to obtain the constitutional majority needed to adopt them.

It is worth mentioning that Armenia’s foreign policy transformation began gradually. In 2017, cooperation with the European Union was largely based on institutional and economic frameworks, including the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement, known as CEPA. After 2023, relations expanded into the security field through EU monitoring missions, military assistance, and programs aimed at strengthening democratic resilience. At the same time, Yerevan reduced its reliance on Russia’s security umbrella and began exploring possibilities for alternative partners.

At the same time, the Second Karabakh War in 2020 made it clear that relations between Armenia and Russia could no longer continue in their previous state. From 2022, Yerevan suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and expressed its intention to move closer to a partnership with the European Union. This opened a tough but essential public debate in Armenia: historical Armenia or real Armenia?

A major turning point in Armenian foreign policy came in 2025 and 2026 when, with the direct mediation by US President Donald Trump, the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan gained new momentum. As a result, the two sides initialed the text of a Peace Agreement confirming their readiness to complete the process of signing and ratifying a final Peace Treaty.

Additionally, on August 8, 2025, the two sides signed historic transport and infrastructure initiative in Washington. The project was developed with US mediation and is known as TRIPP, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, which provides for the development of a transit route across Armenian territory. It will connect mainland Azerbaijan with the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic while fully respecting Armenia’s sovereignty and jurisdiction.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the United States has acquired a special role in Armenia’s security debate. In this case, Washington is acting not as a military power, but as the architect of an economic corridor.

May 8, 2026, was another important date in Armenia’s foreign policy as Yerevan hosted the very first EU-Armenia Summit. During the Summit, the two sides presented a major framework document, the Strategic Agenda for the EU-Armenia Partnership.

Despite vivid success toward pro-Western policy, the Armenian government is still trying to act thoughtfully and maintain a degree of balance. During European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Yerevan on July 2, 2026 the EU offered Armenia a new economic support package worth €18 million. It also proposed removing tariffs on approximately 80% of Armenian exports entering the EU market. Only a few days later, Pashinyan travelled to Yekaterinburg for high-level meetings with Russian officials during INNOPROM 2026. This sequence of events clearly shows Yerevan’s effort to avoid direct confrontation with Moscow.

Although official Yerevan has gradually distanced itself from Moscow in recent years, Russia still maintains important tools of pressure over Armenia. The Armenian economy remains heavily dependent on the Russian market. Around 40% of the country’s exports go to Russia as well as the dependence in the energy sector, labor migration, military cooperation, and Armenia’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), makes a rapid break with Russia simply impossible. These factors also continue to produce new tensions between the two countries.

On July 27, Pashinyan initiated a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, demanding the removal of restrictions on Armenian products, including fruit, vegetables, flowers, alcoholic beverages, and dairy products. According to Yerevan, these restrictions violated both bilateral agreements and EAEU rules. In response, Moscow once again argued that Armenia would have to choose between integration with the European Union and continued membership in the EAEU. A few days later, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service became involved in what had started as a trade and economic dispute. It warned that Armenia’s withdrawal from the EAEU would cause a severe economic crisis in the country. Pashinyan responded that the dispute could become “the beginning of the end of the Eurasian Economic Union” if the organization remained unable to guarantee the free movement of goods. At the same time, he stressed that Armenia has no immediate plan to leave the EAEU.

It is worth mentioning that, on August 4, the tensions also attained a security dimension. Russia’s permanent representative to the CSTO raised the possibility of suspending Armenia’s voting rights in the Organization. The proposal has not become an official decision yet as the next CSTO meeting is scheduled to take place in Moscow on November 11. Still, the statement clearly shows that Moscow wants to turn Armenia’s decision to freeze its participation into a formal sanction imposed by the organization. In addition to its powerful economic instruments, Russia retains significant military leverage through its military base in Gyumri.

The latest developments in the political tensions between Russia and Armenia are also interesting.

On September 1, 2026 on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Bishkek, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan held their first face-to-face meeting since Pashinyan renewed his political mandate. The meeting took place in a tense atmosphere. 

As expected, the Russian President was tough. According to Putin, Armenia needs to clarify, how it plans to settle its intention to seek EU membership (as stated by Nikol Pashinyan in his address to the Armenian Parliament on 24th of August) with its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union.

In response, Nikol Pashinyan reiterated his well-balanced official position that closer ties with the European Union do not automatically mean cutting relations with Russia or leaving the Eurasian Economic Union. He described the meeting as “good” and said that the dialogue between the two countries would continue in Moscow during his upcoming visit.

Russia is clearly increasing its pressure on official Yerevan. Under these conditions, Armenia’s main task is not simply to choose between Russia and the West but to protect its security, sovereignty, and economic resilience through an effective foreign policy.

Armenia’s experience shows how quickly the security architecture of the South Caucasus is changing. Developments in recent years have turned Armenia into an increasingly important partner for the West. In this context, Pashinyan has stated on several occasions that the current difficulties in Georgia-EU relations create additional challenges for Armenia.

Armenia’s closer relationship with the West presents both challenges and opportunities for Georgia. On the one hand, a shift of Western attention and resources toward Armenia could increase regional competition. On the other hand, Georgia must do more than just restoring its own European agenda. It must also develop a regional policy that can turn the West’s growing engagement in the South Caucasus into an advantage for the whole region.

Azerbaijan and Russia

Recent geopolitical changes and local incidents have seriously complicated relations between Azerbaijan and Russia.

The Karabakh Conflict and the Changing Balance of Power

At the end of the active phase of the Karabakh war in 2020, Russian “peacekeepers” were deployed to the region. Moscow was traditionally regarded as Armenia’s main ally, and Baku was not satisfied with this arrangement.

Tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia increased in September 2021. Azerbaijan refused to sign the official mandate for the Russian “peacekeeping” force. It also demanded full control over the Lachin corridor, a demand opposed by the Kremlin.

Despite serious incidents during the conflict, including Azerbaijan’s shooting down of a Russian military helicopter, the two countries maintained their strategic partnership. In February 2022, only a few days before Russia invaded Ukraine, President Ilham Aliyev visited Moscow. During the visit, the two countries signed a Declaration on Allied Interaction.

In 2023, however, Azerbaijan regained full control over Karabakh through a rapid military operation. As a result, Moscow was forced to withdraw its military forces from the region earlier than planned in the spring of 2024.

Russia was deeply involved in its war against Ukraine and could not, or chose not to, intervene. Azerbaijan took advantage of this situation and significantly weakened Moscow’s military leverage in the South Caucasus.

Relations between the two countries became increasingly turbulent over the following years.

In December 2024, Russian air defense forces struck an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger aircraft near Grozny. The badly damaged plane later crashed in Kazakhstan. Moscow tried to conceal the circumstances of the incident, which led to a strong protest from Baku. The situation temporarily stabilized after Putin issued a personal apology.

In May 2025, President Aliyev made a point of not attending the Victory Day parade in Moscow. Instead, he visited Karabakh.

In June of the same year, Russian authorities carried out mass raids against ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg. People were reportedly tortured, and the raids resulted in deaths.

Azerbaijan responded by closing the Russian House in Baku, which operated as an office of Rossotrudnichestvo. It restricted Russian state media and arrested employees of the Sputnik news agency on espionage charges. All joint cultural events were cancelled.

As a further sign of protest, the Azerbaijani parliamentary delegation refused to attend a meeting of the bilateral cooperation commission with Russia. Moscow described these actions as “unfriendly steps” and accused official Baku of deliberately damaging bilateral relations. These incidents brought relations between the two countries to their lowest point in years.

A Temporary De-escalation

In October 2025, Putin and Aliyev met during the Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Dushanbe. Following the meeting, the two sides began to reduce tensions and arranged a mutual release of detainees. Their shared economic interests played an important role in this temporary de-escalation.

Economic ties remain an important part of relations between Azerbaijan and Russia. Russia is one of Azerbaijan’s largest trading partners.

The North-South Transport Corridor is also critically important for both countries. It connects Russia with the Indian Ocean through Azerbaijan and Iran. As Western sanctions have increased Russia’s isolation, Azerbaijan’s role as a transit country has become even more important for Moscow.

In December 2025, relations reached another deadlock. Russia unilaterally closed its investigation into the Azerbaijan Airlines crash and blamed the incident on weather conditions and pilot error. In protest, Aliyev refused to attend meetings of the CIS and the Eurasian Economic Council.

Baku’s Western Vector

At the Munich Security Conference in February 2026, Aliyev publicly accused Russia of deliberately striking the Azerbaijani embassy in Kyiv in 2025.

Azerbaijan also deepened its economic and geopolitical cooperation with the United States and the wider West, including through the TRIPP initiative. Turkey and Western diplomacy have largely replaced Russia’s former role as a security guarantor in the region.

In July 2026, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a strong call for Moscow to stop raising the issue of Karabakh in its dialogue with Armenia. It stressed that Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan and that any attempt to distort the reality of the past conflict is unacceptable.

Azerbaijan’s Firm Support for Ukraine: “Never Accept Occupation”

From the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Azerbaijan tried to follow a policy of strategic balance. It supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while avoiding direct economic and political confrontation with Russia.

From the first days of the war, Baku provided different forms of assistance to Ukraine. It also supported Ukraine in international organizations and other diplomatic formats. These actions repeatedly caused irritation in the Kremlin.

As tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia increased, Baku’s language on Ukraine became more direct and confident.

On July 13, 2026, President Aliyev made several important statements in support of Ukraine during a visit to Shusha.

He called on the Ukrainian people and their leadership never to accept the loss of their territory. He noted that Ukraine had followed this principle despite pressure from some international circles to stop fighting and effectively accept the occupation.

Aliyev also recalled Azerbaijan’s own experience. International mediators had once asked Baku to accept the loss of its occupied territories. Azerbaijan refused to do so and eventually restored its territorial integrity.

Aliyev made three points clear:

● The war must end immediately;

● No country’s borders can be changed through the use of force;

● Russia cannot defeat Ukraine because Ukrainians have fought for freedom throughout their history and are a nation capable of defending itself.

Secret Talks in Baku

President Aliyev also confirmed that Baku had hosted an informal meeting between former senior German and Russian officials. The talks focused on possible ways to end the war in Ukraine.

Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan welcomed any initiative aimed at achieving peace.

Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov described the Azerbaijani president’s position as mistaken and said that Moscow strongly disagreed with his views.

Azerbaijan and Russia continue to maintain pragmatic relations because of their economic interests. However, Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine has weakened Moscow’s influence over Azerbaijan.

Baku is trying to balance its relations with Russia, Turkey, and the West. Its military and political alliance with Ankara gives Azerbaijan the confidence to adopt a much more independent position toward Moscow.

Azerbaijan is using its increased military and political weight, together with Turkey’s support, to defend its national interests in relations with Russia. At times, it is prepared to do so in a firm and confrontational manner.

Türkiye and Russia

Relations between Türkiye and Russia are highly complex and often contradictory. Despite their geopolitical rivalry in the Black Sea, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean regions, Ankara and Moscow have sought to maintain pragmatic cooperation for decades. A sharp deterioration in relations between Türkiye and the West, shifting balances of power in the Middle East, and a degree of vacuum in geostrategic cooperation in the region at a certain stage became key catalysts for closer cooperation between Türkiye and Russia.

However, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine has made it even clearer that cooperation between the two countries is driven primarily by pragmatic calculations rather than shared values. Despite Ankara’s political and military support for Kyiv, Russia limited its response to occasional diplomatic démarches and did not suspend cooperation with Türkiye.

At the same time, Türkiye continued to maneuver strategically within the region and significantly enhanced its diplomatic profile by establishing itself as a mediator in the war in Ukraine. This created the foundation for several humanitarian initiatives, including the safe transportation of grain through the Black Sea and prisoner exchanges.

Recent developments suggest that Türkiye is increasingly moving away from its traditional strategy of balancing between Russia and the West. The NATO summit in Ankara and President Trump’s visit to the Turkish capital underscored Türkiye’s growing strategic importance. It is becoming increasingly evident that, against the backdrop of a Russia weakened by sanctions and the war in Ukraine, Türkiye is deliberately expanding its geographical sphere of influence.

Moreover, Ankara is strengthening its military cooperation with Kyiv and assisting Ukraine in developing its connections in the Middle East.

Ankara’s balanced policy, traditionally characterized by caution toward Russian interests, is becoming increasingly ambitious and independent.

Syria, Ukraine, and other turning points

The radical changes that took place in Syria in December 2024 had a significant impact on relations between Ankara and Moscow. The fall of the Assad regime represented a strategic setback for Russia in the region, substantially weakening its influence and prestige. At the same time, Ankara was able to expand its sphere of influence in Syria and emerged as one of the key partners of the new Syrian government. Türkiye has been actively involved in the modernization and restructuring of the Syrian armed forces, including efforts to replace outdated Soviet-era military equipment.

Notably, in April 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy made his first official visit to Syria aboard a Turkish government aircraft. According to reports, Ukraine had provided assistance to forces fighting against Assad by supplying drones and training drone operators. Beyond Syria, Kyiv has also been actively expanding its contacts with the Gulf states. Following Iran’s attacks on neighboring countries, Ukraine has been sharing its expertise in air defense with them.

Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Türkiye invoked the Montreux Convention and closed the Turkish Straits to military vessels. As a result of Ankara’s decision, combined with the loss of Russia’s naval base in Tartus, Syria, there were no Russian warships in the Mediterranean for the first time since 2013, as of July 2026.

Ankara has repeatedly emphasized that preventing the large-scale war from spilling over into the Black Sea and avoiding threats to maritime navigation are among its key priorities. In December 2025, Russia attacked four Turkish-owned vessels near Odesa. The incidents caused serious concern in Ankara, particularly given that the attacks took place only days after a meeting between Presidents Erdoğan and Putin. Russia has continued to target cargo vessels in the Black Sea, including ships linked to Türkiye, although Ankara has so far limited its response to diplomatic démarches and has refrained from taking retaliatory measures.

Given the trade and economic interdependence between Ankara and Moscow, the two sides have consistently sought to manage their relationship pragmatically and avoid direct confrontation, even during periods of acute crisis. Nevertheless, it is increasingly clear that Türkiye, drawing on its NATO membership and other strategic advantages, will not allow Russia to strengthen its position in the region or in the Black Sea.

Russia’s S-400 air defense systems and U.S. sanctions

In 2017, amid growing tensions between Türkiye and the United States, Ankara signed a $2.5 billion contract with Moscow to purchase S-400 air defense systems. The deal had significant political and economic consequences for Türkiye. In 2019, Washington removed Ankara from the F-35 fifth-generation fighter jet production and procurement program. The United States subsequently imposed sanctions on Türkiye under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

The current trajectory of U.S.-Turkish relations points to a notable thaw, with Türkiye’s reported decision to sell its S-400 systems emerging as one indication of this shift. The Kremlin has confirmed that discussions with Türkiye on the issue are taking place, while describing the matter as “extremely sensitive” and declining to disclose details of the negotiations.

It is also worth noting that during their meeting in Washington in September 2025, President Trump urged his Turkish counterpart to reduce or halt purchases of Russian oil. At the NATO summit in Ankara, Trump stated that he intended to lift sanctions on Türkiye and would consider approving the sale of F-35 fighter jets. Türkiye’s return to the F-35 program would strengthen Ankara’s integration into the Western security architecture and reduce the scope of its defense cooperation with Russia. Nevertheless, reintegration into the program would be a lengthy, complex process, requiring renegotiation of existing contracts, renewed certification, and adjustments to Türkiye’s integration into the program’s industrial supply network.

Taken together, these developments point to a broader rapprochement between the United States and Türkiye and signal a significant shift in Ankara’s strategic calculations.

Trade and economic interdependence

Türkiye’s energy sector remains heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies. In addition, Russia continues to oversee construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in Mersin Province. Russia also plays a significant role in Türkiye’s tourism sector and overall trade relations. Substantial interdependencies and vulnerabilities persist in specific areas of trade, with Türkiye heavily reliant on Russian imports of wheat, corn, and fertilizers.

Türkiye and Russia have also agreed to settle bilateral trade transactions in their national currencies. Given these factors, Ankara has made considerable efforts to avoid confrontation with Moscow. Türkiye remains the only NATO member that has not joined Western sanctions against Russia. Ankara has also maintained direct air links with Moscow, effectively becoming a key air corridor for Russian citizens and businesses traveling to the West.

For Russia, increasingly isolated by Western sanctions, Türkiye has become an important destination for Russian investment, trade, and energy exports. The number of companies registered in Türkiye with Russian capital has increased significantly, while billions of dollars in Russian investment and financial flows have entered the country.

At the same time, Türkiye has in recent years made concerted efforts to diversify its energy sources and reduce its dependence on Russia. More recently, Ankara has significantly expanded its pool of oil suppliers and, since May 2026, has reduced its purchases of Russian oil to its lowest level on record.

The broader picture suggests that Turkish-Russian relations are gradually moving from pragmatic cooperation toward a phase of strategic distancing. Türkiye is increasingly seeking to reduce its dependence on Russia, strengthen its ties with the West, and advance its own regional ambitions and strategic autonomy.

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Photo: Press Service of the Prime Minister of Armenia