Relations between Georgia and the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has been one of Georgia’s most important Western partners and a consistent supporter of the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Since Georgia regained its independence, relations between the two countries have steadily expanded, covering a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues. In 2014, this cooperation was strengthened through the establishment of the Wardrop Strategic Dialogue, a high-level framework for political consultations and cooperation in foreign policy, defence and security, trade and the economy, education, culture, and people-to-people relations.

Since 2024, however, the political relationship has deteriorated sharply. Decisions by the Georgian Dream government have strained Georgia’s ties not only with the United Kingdom but with a number of other Western partners as well. Against the backdrop of democratic backsliding and increasingly anti-Western rhetoric, the Strategic Dialogue was suspended, high-level visits were curtailed, and direct UK government assistance programmes were halted.

The importance of the UK relationship cannot be measured simply by the amount of bilateral assistance involved. For Georgia, British diplomatic support has served a broader strategic purpose. The United Kingdom is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a nuclear-armed state, and one of NATO’s leading European military powers. It therefore has considerable influence in the institutions that matter most to Georgia’s foreign and security policy.

For a country whose territory remains partially occupied by Russia, that support is far from symbolic. Strong relationships with influential NATO members help Georgia keep its security concerns on the international agenda and preserve diplomatic support for its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The deterioration of relations with London therefore carries an opportunity cost that is difficult to quantify. Georgia is not simply losing individual programmes, meetings, or exchanges. It risks weakening a network of political and institutional relationships that has supported its Euro-Atlantic integration for more than three decades.

Political Support and Institutional Development

Diplomatic relations between Georgia and the United Kingdom were first established in 1919 and restored in 1992 following the re-establishment of Georgia’s independence. Over the following decades, the relationship developed around several shared priorities: Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, democratic and institutional development, regional security, economic cooperation and the country’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

Following the August 2008 war, British support for Georgia increased. London’s backing for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, its support for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and its policy of non-recognition towards Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia became particularly important internationally.

The establishment of the Wardrop Strategic Dialogue in 2014 provided a regular framework for high-level political consultations. Its importance went beyond an annual diplomatic meeting. It brought together cooperation in foreign policy, defence and security, trade and the economy, education, culture, and wider people-to-people relations.

British engagement in Georgia has also placed considerable emphasis on strengthening state institutions. From 2015, the UK Government’s Good Governance Fund supported programmes designed to improve public-sector effectiveness, strengthen transparency and accountability, and address corruption. Assistance covered areas such as civil-service reform, the judiciary, financial transparency, and the modernisation of government institutions. British programmes and embassy-funded initiatives also supported civil society, human rights, gender equality, minority communities, independent media, and economic opportunities in Georgia’s regions. More than £5 million was allocated by the Good Governance Fund to projects implemented specifically in Georgia. A significant part of the Fund’s work, however, consisted of regional programmes involving Georgia alongside Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The overall scale of British assistance benefiting Georgia was therefore considerably greater.

UK support also extended beyond the Good Governance Fund. During periods of crisis, most notably after the 2008 war, the British Government allocated more than £5 million in total to provide shelter for internally displaced people and support humanitarian operations carried out by the Red Cross.

The relationship was further institutionalised in 2019 with the signing of the UK–Georgia Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The agreement was designed to preserve much of the framework that had governed UK–Georgia relations through the EU–Georgia Association Agreement once Britain left the European Union (January 31, 2020). It maintained preferential trade arrangements while establishing a broader framework for cooperation in political and security affairs, fundamental freedoms and human rights, education, transport, financial services, and other sectors.

Countering disinformation also became an increasingly important area of British involvement. This reflected growing concern over Kremlin-linked propaganda, and anti-Western narratives in Georgia.

Today, much of this cooperation has been reduced. The government-to-government assistance has now been significantly curtailed. In December 2024, the British Government announced the immediate suspension of programme support to the Georgian government, linking the decision directly to concerns over democratic norms and freedoms.

The suspension of Good Governance Fund programmes and the freezing of direct government assistance represent London’s formal response to Georgia’s democratic backsliding and anti-Western rhetoric. Yet, the support for Georgian society, independent institutions and people-to-people links may continue even as official political relations remain strained.

Defence and Security

Security cooperation has traditionally been among the strongest pillars of the bilateral relationship. Britain has contributed to the modernisation of the Georgian Defence Forces through military education, strategic advice, professional training and participation in multinational exercises. Georgian officers have studied at British defence institutions, British military personnel have participated in exercises including Noble Partner and Agile Spirit, and British advisers have supported defence reforms intended to improve Georgia’s interoperability with NATO.

Cybersecurity was another increasingly important area of cooperation as Georgia faced a growing range of hybrid threats. British assistance contributed to strengthening the resilience of Georgian institutions against Russian cyberattacks and disinformation and supported the development of specialist expertise.

Trade and Investments

The economic relationship has so far proved more resilient than political ties. The 2019 Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Agreement preserved preferential trading arrangements after Brexit and remains in effect. It covers trade in goods and services, intellectual property, geographical indications and government procurement, among other areas. The UK is also one of Georgia’s major import partners, ranking among its ten largest, although the value of Georgian exports to the British market remains considerably smaller.

British capital has a significant presence in Georgia, particularly in financial services, energy, infrastructure, professional services and tourism. The United Kingdom has also regularly appeared among Georgia’s major sources of foreign direct investment, although these statistics require careful interpretation. Georgia’s two largest banks, TBC Bank and Bank of Georgia are registered in the United Kingdom and both are listed on the London Stock Exchange. Their activities are therefore statistically classified as British investment.

The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline remains one of the most significant examples of British commercial involvement in Georgia. Led by British Petroleum, the project helped establish Georgia as an important transit corridor connecting Caspian energy resources with Western markets while reducing dependence on routes through Russia. Beyond transforming Georgia into an indispensable geopolitical transit hub for the West, BP remains one of Georgia’s the most important long-term investors and continues to contribute to the country’s investment environment.

Bilateral economic ties have remained relatively resilient despite the deterioration in political relations. British Airways restored scheduled services between London and Tbilisi in 2025, while easyJet entered the Georgian market. Vodafone Group also established a partnership with Georgian mobile operator Cellfie Mobile. These, however, appear to reflect the momentum created by previously strong bilateral relations, as well as established commercial interests and business networks, rather than a broader improvement in political ties.

This separation between political and economic relations is an important feature of the current relationship. Political deterioration has not yet translated into significant economic disengagement, but there is no guarantee that this will continue indefinitely. Investment decisions depend not only on immediate commercial returns but also on political stability, regulatory predictability, the rule of law, judicial independence, and perceptions of a country’s broader international trajectory. A prolonged deterioration in Georgia’s relations with Britain and other Western partners could therefore gradually affect the environment in which future investment decisions are made.

Education and People-to-People Relations

Education remains one of the most successful areas of bilateral cooperation. Georgian students make extensive use of programmes and scholarships offered by British universities, while large-scale English-language teaching programmes operate with the support of the British Council.

Access to UK and other internationally recognised examination services gives Georgian students access to established English-language teaching methodologies and internationally recognised qualifications across a range of subjects. These opportunities are complemented by UK Government-supported scholarships, allowing some of Georgia’s strongest students to pursue further study in the United Kingdom.

These educational and people-to-people connections are particularly valuable because they create relationships that extend beyond government institutions. Even when political relations become difficult, academic, professional, and personal networks can continue to connect the two societies.

Political Tensions and Sanctions

British concerns intensified following the adoption of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, increasing anti-Western rhetoric and wider concerns over Georgia’s democratic trajectory. The crisis deepened following Georgia’s October 2024 parliamentary elections and the protests that followed. The UK paused the Wardrop Strategic Dialogue and subsequently restricted other areas of bilateral cooperation. In December, Foreign Secretary David Lammy announced that Britain would immediately suspend all programme support to the Georgian government, including assistance delivered through the Good Governance Fund, restrict defence cooperation and limit engagement with representatives of the Georgian Dream government. This was followed by a series of individual sanctions. The measures included asset freezes and travel bans. The media outlets Imedi and POSTV, described as propaganda organisations, were also sanctioned.

Suspended programmes, reduced defence cooperation, fewer high-level political contacts and diminished access to British expertise within government institutions are the visible immediate consequences. The longer-term costs, however, may prove more significant.

• Georgia risks losing or most probably, has already lost political capital. Strong bilateral relationships with countries such as the United Kingdom give Georgia influential advocates within NATO and the wider European security architecture. For a small state facing Russian military occupation, the erosion of those relationships narrows its diplomatic room for manoeuvre.

• There is a risk to institutional capacity. Technical assistance, professional exchanges, and specialist advice build knowledge over time. Once cooperation networks are dismantled, they cannot necessarily be restored quickly, even if political relations eventually improve.

• There is a security cost. Georgia faces conventional, cyber and information threats from Russia. Reduced cooperation with one of Europe’s leading security and intelligence powers means less access to expertise at a time when the regional security environment is becoming more dangerous.

• There is a potential economic and reputational cost. Existing trade and investment have so far remained relatively resilient, but future investors will assess Georgia partly through the quality of its institutions and its relationships with Western partners.

• Finally, there is an opportunity cost. The consequences of deteriorating relations cannot be measured simply by adding up the programmes that have already been suspended. They also include initiatives that may never be launched, such as new defence cooperation, cybersecurity programmes, technical assistance, educational partnerships, investment promotion and diplomatic initiatives that would otherwise have developed as the strategic partnership matured. This may ultimately prove the largest cost of all.

The deterioration of UK–Georgia relations should be understood as part of a broader transformation in Georgia’s relationship with the West.

For much of the period since independence, Georgian foreign policy rested on the assumption that closer political, economic, and institutional integration with Western countries would gradually strengthen the country’s security and development. The United Kingdom was among the countries that invested political capital, expertise, and financial resources in that process.

Today, the political foundation on which deeper cooperation was built has changed. The longer government-to-government relations remain frozen, the greater the risk that temporary suspensions become structural. Institutional contacts may weaken, expertise may move elsewhere, new programmes may bypass Georgia, and political attention may shift towards partners considered more reliable.

Rebuilding the relationship would therefore require more than improved rhetoric or the resumption of diplomatic meetings. It would require sufficient confidence in Georgia’s democratic institutions, rule of law, and political direction for both sides to see renewed strategic cooperation as credible and sustainable.

The costs already visible suggest that distancing Georgia from a partner with the United Kingdom’s diplomatic influence, security capabilities, economic networks, and long-standing support does not advance Georgia’s national interests.